Encryption, two democracies, two ways to weaken it

French lawmakers strike the ban on imposing backdoors. Ottawa wants the power to impose surveillance capabilities. What it means for you.

Back in April, we mapped nineteen laws chipping away at privacy around the world. One of the tricks they share is breaking encryption by statute. France and Canada have each just added their own spin on it.


What’s happening


In France, a safeguard being removed. The Resilience bill (projet de loi Résilience) is France’s vehicle for transposing NIS2, the EU’s cybersecurity directive. Along the way, the French Senate added Article 16 bis, which barred anyone from forcing encryption providers to integrate “technical devices intended to deliberately weaken security”, such as “master decryption keys” (our translation).

Put simply, Article 16 bis was the Holy Grail of your digital freedom, a ban written into law on any backdoor, or any other contraption, that would let someone break encryption.

Back in April, we called it a genuine line of defense against Chat Control, a proposed EU regulation that would do the exact opposite and scan your messages on your own device before they’re even encrypted. Brussels is still haggling over it.

Europe, schizophrenic? This time I think we can say yes without blinking.

Long story short, on October 3, 2026, the government tabled amendment No. 358, which would strike the now-famous Article 16 bis from the bill, citing a major risk to national security and a clash with lawful interception.

In other words, the government wanted to keep the option of mandating access to encrypted data.

At a time when attacks are growing exponentially, not least with a helping hand from AI, the plan is to weaken encryption, or even break it outright. What could possibly go wrong?

Right, message received. Under the banner of fighting child sexual exploitation, Chat Control’s stated purpose and a cause everyone signs up to, what the EU and some of its member states are really dreaming of is mass surveillance of the entire population.

By playing the national security card to get the article scrapped, the government is leaving the door wide open, even as it swears it won’t walk through.

If this reminds you of China or Iran, well… that’s to be expected, except this is happening right here in France, the self-proclaimed land of human rights that never tires of lecturing the rest of the world.

And when you see what a “Made in EU” label is actually worth on security, it does make you wonder. Go back and read our piece on Passwork, the “Made in EU” app certified by Russia’s FSB (yes, really!) if you need convincing.

After being postponed in October, the bill finally reached the floor on November 9. The very next day, deputies voted to strike Article 16 bis, by 69 votes to 37. Only 107 of the Assembly’s 577 members took part. The far-right National Rally (RN), the centrist bloc, the right, the Socialists present and the LIOT group voted in favor, France Unbowed (LFI) and the Greens against. The text still has to clear a final vote on the bill as a whole on November 17, then go to a joint committee of both houses with the Senate, which had voted for the article.

On the day of the vote, the Interior Minister swore that striking the article “will not amount to authorizing” backdoors (our translation). As the French saying goes, promises only bind those who listen to them. What’s real is the deleted article. The promise isn’t written into any law.

In Canada, a capability being imposed. Bill C-22, the Lawful Access Act, 2026, was introduced on March 12 and cleared the House of Commons on June 18. On October 22, the Senate sent it to its national security committee. On November 2, the Privacy Commissioner told senators the bill still needs more amendments.

Part 2 would let the government set, by regulation, “operational and technical capabilities” that providers have to build in. A minister could also hand any provider an order lasting up to two years, with the sign-off of the Intelligence Commissioner.

As amended in June, the bill says no obligation can force a provider to decrypt, unless it supplied the encryption itself and holds the means to remove it. It also rules out any measure that would create a “systemic vulnerability”, meaning a flaw that would expose every user, not just the person being targeted. And it caps metadata retention at six months. So C-22 doesn’t spell out a requirement to break encryption, and Public Safety Canada insists it doesn’t impose backdoors.

Michael Geist, in an independent analysis, still sees wiggle room. A carve-out for people already named in a warrant could let the government impose a targeted capability that ends up weakening encryption for everyone. The Citizen Lab, a University of Toronto research group that openly opposes the bill, wants Part 2 scrapped entirely, alongside the Canadian Civil Liberties Association (CCLA), an advocacy group.


Two methods, one direction


The two cases aren’t connected. No shared text, no coordinated timetable. Yet they’re working the same material. In France, they’re taking down the “no drilling” sign on the wall. In Canada, they’re writing into law who gets to order the work, while promising not to touch the load-bearing walls.

In both countries, national security and investigators’ needs are being pitted against encryption.

In France, the safeguard was an article lawmakers have just struck down.

In Canada, it’s a clause banning any flaw that affects everyone, without saying where such a flaw begins.

In our map of nineteen laws, the second mechanism, breaking encryption by law, already showed democracies getting in on the act, each in its own way.

Scrapping the ban or empowering the government to give the orders, that’s two more ways of chipping away at citizens’ digital freedoms.

Nothing is final yet. In France, the joint committee can restore the article, and the Canadian bill can still be amended in the Senate.


What it changes for you


Your Mac isn’t going to change overnight. These laws target providers, not you, so your protection depends on what your provider can actually hand over when the authorities come knocking.

A provider doesn’t have to decrypt what it has no way of decrypting. If you hold the only key to a safe, the manufacturer can’t open it, even under orders.

Choose end-to-end encryption wherever it exists. For your messages, Signal, or iMessage between Apple devices. For iCloud, turn on Advanced Data Protection. Without it, Apple holds the keys to a good chunk of what you store there, including your iCloud Backup, which keeps a copy of your messages.

In the UK, Advanced Data Protection has been closed to new users since February 2025, and Apple is still fighting the British order in court.

Check which country’s law your provider answers to. These laws bite on companies operating in the country concerned. Before trusting a service with your data, find out where it’s based, and what digital freedom policy applies in that country.

And don’t forget that anything in the US orbit has been subject to the CLOUD Act since 2018. In practice, US courts can compel an American company to hand over the data it holds, wherever its servers happen to be.

If that data is end-to-end encrypted, all it can hand over is what it has, which is unreadable gibberish. The metadata, on the other hand, stays readable.

Don’t count on the law to protect you. Article 16 bis was supposed to be a bulwark, and less than two years was enough to bring it down in the National Assembly.

What one law grants, another can take away.

A key that never leaves your devices isn’t safe from a capability imposed on the software itself, but it forces the law to break the door down instead of asking politely.

Your best defense is tools whose code is public and where you alone hold the key. Free and open-source software has plenty of them, so lean on those.

We’ll update this radar as soon as either bill moves.

Read next, Six months and nineteen global texts, the terrifying convergence and NIS2 forces companies to encrypt. CSAR prevents them from really doing it.


Sources


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Canada